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ABSTRACT 
The regulatory enforcement literature distinguishes many influences on enforcement agencies among 
them the institutional location (and independence) of agencies, and the incumbent government’s 
ideology. Where an agency is located within a dichotomy comprising independent agencies and those 
tied to the executive arm of government is argued to influence the level of political influence on the 
agency’s operations. Likewise, the collectivist or individualist ideology of a government influences its 
willingness to resource enforcement agencies and approve regulatory activities, subject to economic 
conditions. An exploration of agencies regulating minimum labour standards in the Australian federal 
industrial relations jurisdiction 1904-2007 highlights differences in Australian practice: institutional 
location is more complex than the literature reveals, while distinctions between political influence and 
agency types are more illusory than real; and prevailing political ideology does not affect minimum 
labour standards enforcement agencies as much as political needs.   
INTRODUCTION 
The regulatory enforcement literature highlights the premise that regulatory agencies do not 
operate in a vacuum insulated from broader society, and has identified a range of environmental 
influences capable of affecting an agency’s operations: economic, political, broader policy 
debates and the media (Hutter and Manning 1990); broader social and moral context (Black 
2001); legislative design (Black 2001; Baldwin 1990); legal culture (Kagan 1989; Hawkins and 
Thomas 1984) and business behaviour (Hawkins 2002; Black 2001). Interactions within and 
between these environmental factors and an enforcement agency will, to a significant degree, 
affect the internal operation of the enforcement agency by influencing among other things the 
institutional location of an agency (Hawkins 2002; Hutter 1989; Hawkins and Thomas 1984) and 
the enforcement strategies adopted by the agency (Freiberg 2002; Black 2001; Hutter and 
Manning 1990; Hutter 1989).  
Additionally, in respect of political influence generally, Hutter and Manning (1990:107-111) 
suggest that when the prevailing government ideology is collectivist or interventionist, there is a 
greater likelihood that, subject to the state of the economy, resource levels will allow for 
increased regulatory activity reflecting government policy on protection of workers and the 
public at large. Conversely, when the incumbent government has an individualistic, conservative 
ideology, the laissez faire underpinning will work to reduce the resources available to agencies, 
and decrease the level of regulatory activity. In the context of the Australian conciliation and 
arbitration system Bennett (1994) argues that successive federal governments have maintained 
considerably more direct influence over the enforcement agency than other institutions within 
that system. While the courts, and to a lesser extent, the arbitral tribunals have been able to 
distance themselves from governments, the enforcement agencies ‘have been very vulnerable to 
changes in their political environment’ (Bennett 1994:146).  
Our focus here is on political influence: its observed effects on the institutional location of the 
minimum labour standards enforcement agency, and how prevailing political ideology affects the 
enforcement capabilities and strategies of that agency. This paper is divided into 3 sections. The 
first outlines and compares different institutional types in use in Australia for enforcing minimum 
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standards regulation, as well as addressing the arguments related to institutional location. The 
second explores historical aspects of the minimum labour standards enforcement agency in its 
various forms between 1904 and 2007, its institutional locations and political influences evident 
during that period, before a discussion and conclusions in the third section.  
INSTITUTIONAL LOCATION 
In discussing the concept of institutional location the regulatory enforcement literature makes a 
distinction between an independent regulatory agency and one tied to the executive arm of 
government. Within the Australian context a number of agency types are discernible: agency 
within a government department, agency attached to a government department, executive agency 
and statutory authority. With regard to agencies linked to government departments, the 
distinction between those attached to a department (i.e. having departmental agency status) and 
those incorporated into core departmental structures rests in the reporting mechanisms. In those 
attached to a department, the agency head reports to the Departmental Secretary (or delegated 
officer), but the agency enjoys a high degree of independence with regard to the manner in which 
the agency achieves its objectives as established through Ministerial Directions. Conversely, 
where an agency is incorporated into core departmental structures its operational procedures are 
directly aligned with broader departmental (and governmental) objectives and decision-making 
hierarchy (Tregillis Report 1988). 
Executive agencies are created or abolished by the Governor-General (in Council) after a 
portfolio department makes a recommendation to Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) which is 
vetted by the Prime Minister (Australia 2000). Wettenhall (2003:11) argues that the executive 
agency provisions were included in the Public Service Act at the behest of PM&C officials who 
identified a need for ‘a structural arrangement falling somewhere between a departmental 
division and that of a statutory authority, allowing a degree of operational independence and a 
separate organisational base for senior public officials with specialised cross-departmental 
functions.’ A more recent rationale for the creation of executive agencies is that whilst the 
assigned responsibilities do not fall within normal departmental functions, they do not warrant 
the degree of autonomy given to statutory agencies (Wettenhall 2003; Australian Public Service 
Commission 2007). While the agency head is responsible for managing the agency and is 
accountable to the government, the parliament and the public in the same way as the Secretary of 
a department (Public Service Act 1999: s.66), a direct relationship exists between the minister and 
the head of the executive agency. 
Statutory authorities are bodies or groups of persons established by legislation which also sets out 
‘the arrangements for the appointment and termination of the agency head and their specific 
powers, responsibilities and accountability requirements’ (Australian Public Service Commission 
2007). Importantly, the statute determines the extent of the autonomy provided to the authority 
and the limits of ministerial intervention in its affairs. Wettenhall (2005) describes the 
relationship between parliament and the government of the day (composed of ministerial 
departments) as a two-way relationship whilst, for statutory authorities, a triangular or three-way 
relationship exists between parliament, government and statutory authorities. Further, part of 
parliament’s role in this relationship is to protect and support in situations where a statutory 
authority feels compelled to criticise or take a position different to the minister or departments 
(Wettenhall 2005). 
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When viewed as a simple dichotomy (regulation through delegated authority versus elected 
representatives having direct control over regulation), there is general agreement that an agency’s 
location within a government structure affects the degree of political control that can be exercised 
over it. Additionally, Hutter and Manning (1990:110-1) argue that the enforcement strategies of 
agencies tied to the executive arm of government are influenced by both the ‘internal pattern of 
power within government Ministries’ (where the hierarchical position of a particular Department 
affects ‘the degree of power and discretion’ it possesses within government), and by the agency 
executives’ relationship with private industry. The level of influence is explored in the following 
section that traces the institutional location of the ‘inspectorate’ through numerous incarnations 
and political changes, as well as the effects of political ideology. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Early minimum standards regulation in Australia (such as the colonial Factories and Shops Acts) 
established the legitimacy of the state to intervene in areas previously governed by laissez-faire 
doctrines and signalled a change in both societal and political attitudes towards government 
invention in what were considered private business affairs. The colonial legislation located 
enforcement agencies within public service departments, as opposed to establishing independent 
agencies and required that the Minister be informed of, and agree to all prosecutions for breaches 
of the Acts. This arrangement recognised the degree of mistrust on the part of employers towards 
this new and challenging form of legislation, and Ministerial control would have been more 
acceptable than an independent agency (Goodwin 2004). From an institutional location 
perspective, this set in place a ‘convention’ whereby successive state and federal governments 
located minimum labour standard enforcement agencies within departments and maintained 
strong Ministerial oversight of enforcement policies and strategies, especially prosecution policy.  
Unions initially undertook enforcement under the federal Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 
(the Act) as it failed to establish an enforcement inspectorate. Despite amendments in 1928 to 
appoint inspectors to investigate compliance with the Act, awards, or regulations as directed by 
the Minister, none were hired until 1934 when a single inspector was appointed and remained the 
sole federal inspector until 1940 (Goodwin 2004). The number of inspectors gradually increased 
and 1952 amendments to the Act gave an Arbitration Inspectorate (as opposed to a group of 
appointed inspectors) permanent status as an agency within Public Service administration 
(Arbitration Inspectorate Manual 1954: Foreword). 
In 1954 the inspectorate was formally attached to the Industrial Relations Division (IRD) of the 
Department of Labour and National Service (DLNS) (IRD Annual Review 1954). While the 
inspectorate Director and Regional Directors were responsible to the Assistant Secretary 
(Industrial Relations) of the DLNS, their roles contained a high degree of independence with 
regard to operational matters including a relatively free hand in organising and overseeing 
inspectorate activity. However, inspectorate policy was expected to reflect government policy 
and prosecution policy was effectively controlled by the Minister, through the Assistant Secretary 
who was solely authorised to approve all prosecutions. From 1943, when the first employer 
prosecution for non-compliance occurred, to 1968 only 67 prosecutions were undertaken, an 
annual average of fewer than three prosecutions (Parliamentary Debates 25 February 1969: 73–
80) As Shadow Minister in Opposition, Clyde Cameron argued that these statistics demonstrated 
prosecution inertia as the inspectorate’s prosecution policy continued to be constrained by the 
politically based directives of the Minister and that prosecution decisions should be made within 
the inspectorate free of Ministerial influences (Parliamentary Debates 10 May 1972:2317–2337).  
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However, as the relevant Minister Cameron failed to officially cede such control to the 
inspectorate. Although his Ministerial Directions reproduced the earlier prosecution procedures, 
Cameron’s publicly stated desire to use prosecutions as a deterrent to non-compliant employers 
required procedural reforms (Parliamentary Debates 25 May 1973:2713–4). Consequently, the 
Minister (through the Departmental Secretary) devolved authority to approve prosecutions to 
Regional Directors. Rather than prescribing the shift to a more rigorous prosecution policy 
officially through his Ministerial Directions, Cameron chose to decentralise decision-making 
procedures, providing inspectors with training in prosecution techniques and creating an 
inspectorate culture where recalcitrant employers could expect to be prosecuted. Interviews with 
former inspectors established that provided an inspector’s case met the required evidentiary 
requirements permission to prosecute was given. This is reflected in prosecution figures for the 
period 1973/74 to 1975/76 when non-compliance prosecution actions were taken against 239 
employers, an average of almost 80 per year (Arbitration Inspectorate annual reports).  
The institutional location of the inspectorate between the early 1950s and 1975 represents a 
hybrid arrangement not specifically acknowledged by the independent agency—government 
agency typology. As a departmental agency the inspectorate was attached to a government 
department but enjoyed a high degree of autonomy over how it utilised allocated resources, 
controlled day-to-day activities such as recruitment, training, general administration and the 
inspection policy and strategies it adopted. Further, reminiscent of the colonial factories and 
shops inspectorates, the extent of inspectorate independence was reflected in its use of annual 
reports to critically evaluate resource limitations and publicly discuss legislative inadequacies in 
respect of enforcement. The prosecution policy adopted, however, was heavily influenced by the 
Minister of the day. 
Following the election of the Fraser government in December 1975, the inspectorate was attached 
to the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations until the establishment of the 
Industrial Relations Bureau (IRB) as an independent statutory authority in 1978. The government 
presented the IRB as the ‘third arm’ of the conciliation and arbitration machinery (the 
Commission and the Federal Court being the other two) and its Director was given status equal to 
a Presidential Member of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. To fulfil this 
role the IRB was responsible for enforcing the whole Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (the 
Act) as opposed to concentrating on award enforcement (Parliamentary Debates 31 March 
1977:838). On commencement of IRB operations on 1March 1978, the former Arbitration 
Inspectorate became the Awards Division within the IRB structure.  
The Fraser government broke with tradition and, in 1978 issued the most prescriptive set of 
Ministerial Directions to that date which served to significantly reduce the autonomy of both 
inspectorate management and field inspectors. By codifying the ‘criteria to be applied by 
inspectors and Regional Offices in determining action to be taken in relation to securing… 
regulations and awards’ (DEIR Annual Report1976/77:15) the Fraser government had two 
objectives: to shift the inspectorate’s official enforcement policy to reflect the government’s 
views on the regulation of the employment relationship, especially the deterrence mechanisms to 
be used against employers; and to reduce the autonomy of the inspectorate to promote the new 
official enforcement policy (Goodwin 2004). On establishment the IRB incorporated these 
Directions as its operational code of practice for the Awards Division (Annual Report 
1977/78:33). Consequently, the IRB’s enforcement policy and, in particular its prosecution 
policy, clearly reflected the views of the Coalition government which, when in Opposition, had 
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strongly criticised the approach adopted under Cameron (Parliamentary Debates 25 May 
1973:2714–2715). This is reflected in the substantial decrease in the number of employer non-
compliance prosecutions to 71 for the five full years of IRB operations (1978/79 to 1982/83), an 
average of 14 per year (IRB annual reports).  
Although regulation theory suggests that as an independent agency the IRB would be subject to 
significantly less political influence than that traditionally faced by the Arbitration Inspectorate, 
in fact the reverse occurred. Not only did the IRB have a more politically developed and 
prescriptive set of enforcement criteria, its inspectors lost considerable autonomy. This suggests 
that within the politically charged arena of Australian industrial relations, the institutional 
location of an enforcement agency can be used to portray political independence when, in fact, 
the opposite is true.  
With the election of the Hawke government in 1983 the IRB was abolished and the Arbitration 
Inspectorate re-created, ostensibly with its previous powers and status (Parliamentary Debates 11 
May 1983:397). However, a subtle shift in terminology provided an insight into future 
institutional location and policy directions under the Hawke/Keating Labor governments. 
Previously, government documents had referred to the relationship of the inspectorate as being 
attached to the relevant department. In his Second Reading speech Minister Willis stated that the 
inspectorate would be located within the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations 
(Parliamentary Debates 11 May 1983:397).  
Initially the re-instituted inspectorate operated in a manner similar to the pre-IRB era,  however, 
by the mid 1980s the executive within the recently created Department of Industrial Relations 
(DIR), with at least tacit approval of the Minister’s office, started to formulate a significant policy 
shift for award enforcement. The inspectorate had been allowed to exercise control over their 
operations for the first two years and inspectors enjoyed increased autonomy, but by 1985/86 the 
‘within the Department’ institutional location started to take effect as labour inspection became 
entwined in the department’s corporate operations (DIR Annual Report 1985/86:1). An 
investigation of the role and function of the inspectorate began, undertaken by a consultant, B.H. 
Tregillis (Tregillis1988).  
In canvassing issues concerning the institutional location of the inspectorate, Tregillis considered 
the following options: independent agency status, departmental agency status (either as part of 
DIR or the Attorney-General’s department), or incorporation into core departmental structures 
(Tregillis 1988:5). Tregillis was presented with ‘strongly held views’ particularly from 
inspectorate staff who had worked under Cameron or the IRB. They argued that the 
inspectorate’s enforcement role was incompatible with other departmental functions and 
objectives, in particular, the department’s liaison and intelligence gathering role where close 
working relations with business, employer organisations and unions were paramount 
(Tregillis1988:6; DIR/PSU Joint Task Group Report 1993:14–15). Inspectors were very 
concerned that they would be captured by the different culture within the department: ‘they just 
didn’t understand what our job was’ and were ‘very uncomfortable with the idea of confronting 
employers’ (Goodwin 2004: interviews). 
Not only did Tregillis dismiss these concerns in a cursory manner, he went further by stating that 
it was essential to link inspectorate activities to that of the department:  
It is quite clear that in undertaking some inspections, inspectors will unearth 
situations in which there are breaches of the award, the correction of which, if not 
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handled carefully might create serious industrial relations problems. The question of 
the correct approach in dealing with such breaches is not a matter which should be 
dealt with by officers of the Inspectorate acting independently (DIR/Tregillis 1988:6). 
No examples of this inspectoral independence were cited in the Report and an examination of 
inspectorate’s annual reports back to 1972 could find no reference to this occurring. It would 
appear that the real goal of having the inspectorate located within a division of the department 
was that enforcement policy (particularly inspection and prosecution strategies) could be aligned 
with broader departmental (and governmental) objectives (Tregillis 1988:6–9). Based on the 
Tregillis Report and an ACTU/DIR (1990) review, the Arbitration Inspectorate was abolished in 
1990 and replaced by the Awards Management Branch (AMB) within the Industrial Relations 
Development Division (IRDD) of the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR).  
The effect of this incremental institutional re-location decision on the ‘enforcement agency’ can 
be traced through annual reports. The demise of the independent annual report commenced with 
the 1988/89 report which was the first report to clearly depart from ILO Convention No.81 
reporting requirements (ILO 1979). While the original 1988/89 draft report had adopted the 
traditional inspectorate format, it was effectively re-written before being incorporated into the 
department’s annual report (Goodwin 2004: interview). With the creation of the Awards 
Management Branch in 1990/91 even this limited ‘independent reporting’ ceased. In the 1992/93 
DIR annual report the concepts of enforcement and compliance were replaced with the aim of 
improving the way federal awards and agreements work, including helping people comply. 
Arguably by 1993/94, but certainly by 1994/95, the remnants of enforcement work were so 
integrated into the normal routine of the department that it became almost impossible to 
differentiate it from the general service provided to government to advance their programs. Not 
surprisingly, only 6 employer non-compliance prosecutions were reported between 1990/91 and 
1995/96, albeit the poor reporting standards adopted may have resulted in a few prosecutions 
going unreported (DIR annual reports 1990/91-1995/96). 
While there may be a degree of logic in adopting the within department approach recommended 
by the Tregillis Report, the new relationships re-invented the underlying purpose of an 
inspectorate. Rather than having an enforcement agency with a focus on ensuring compliance 
with minimum labour standards as required by ILO Convention No.81, the new institutional 
location effectively subordinated enforcement policy and practice to broader departmental or 
governmental priorities to a degree not previously experienced. This outcome supports Hutter and 
Manning’s (1990:110–1) argument that when an enforcement agency is located within a 
government department enforcement policy will be subject to the degree of power possessed by 
that department within the government decision-making hierarchy. Under the Hawke/Keating 
Labor government minimum labour standards enforcement were clearly subjugated by the 
economic imperatives advanced by other, more powerful, Ministers and their departments. 
A departmental restructure after the 1996 election led to the Department of Industrial Relations 
being renamed the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business and the 
Awards Management Branch being rebadged as the Office of Workplace Services (OWS). While 
the central role of OWS remained substantially unchanged, processes for contracting-out the 
Commonwealth’s award management functions on a fee for service bases to State Governments 
were implemented (Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [DEWR] annual 
reports).  OWS compliance activity continued to be integrated into broader departmental services 
to the Government, in particular the promotion of the new Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the 
Political influence & minimum labour standards enforcement   7 
 
Act). Operational audits were also conducted on the manner in which the contracted State 
government inspectors were enforcing awards and agreements to ensure that they complied with 
DEWR enforcement and education policies resulting in adjustments being made (DEWR annual 
report 1999/00). During the 10 year period of OWS being integrated within the department the 
prosecution policy continued to be tightly controlled by the central office in Canberra, and 
between 1996/97 and 2005/06 only 35 employer non-compliance prosecutions were 
recommended. Once again, poor reporting standards may have led to a few prosecutions going 
unreported between 1999/00 and 2001/02 (DEWR annual reports).  
Following the 2001 election the Howard government launched the Uhrig Review into statutory 
authorities with the aim of reforming the governance structures of these agencies. While well 
received by the government, senior public servants and corporate lawyers, Uhrig’s Report (Uhrig 
2003) received considerably less support from public policy commentators who argued that an 
inadequate review process had led to substantial weaknesses and oversights in the report’s 
recommendations (see for example Fels and Brenchley 2004; Bartos 2005; Holland 2004). Of 
concern here are Uhrig’s recommendations that serve to dismantle the triangular relationship 
between parliament, government and statutory authorities.  
Drawing on the corporate governance model, Uhrig (2003:21) perceived governance as 
encompassing ‘the arrangements by which owners, or their representatives, delegate and limit 
power to enhance the entity’s prospects for long term success.’ In his analysis of the Report 
Wettenhall (2003) considers the effect of ministers responding to parliamentary questions on the 
authority’s behalf (as though they were integral parts of their departments), and the requirement 
that authorities advise the minister [and presumably get approval] of potential interactions with 
parliament prior to establishing contact as an indication that: 
The inquiry was clearly driven by a desire to improve ministerial control with a 
‘governance’ paradigm that believed all delegations of power should be strictly 
delimited. Scant attention was given to the interests of the legislature. …parliament 
has a strong interest in how statutory authorities operate within the legislative 
contexts it has itself established, and that proper pursuit of that interest requires 
recognition that the relationship framework of statutory authorities is different to 
that of departments. 
Hence, by replacing the triangular relationship with a linear relationship, one outcome of the 
Uhrig Report was to enhance minister’s power to direct and control statutory authorities, 
acknowledged by Joe Hockey, then Minister for Human Services, when he stated that the aim of 
abolishing the boards overseeing Centrelink and the Health Insurance Commission was to bring 
those organisations ‘under strong ministerial control’ (Gourley 2005:8).  
Criticisms of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) introduced in the Workplace Relations 
Act 1996 made the government aware of the need to counter an expected backlash over new 
AWA ‘flexibilities’ contained in the WorkChoices amendments which took effect on 27 March 
2006. To address this situation the government’s WorkChoices suite of changes established the 
OWS as an Executive Agency (Australia 2006), with the Minister for Employment and 
Workplace Relations as the Minister responsible. Although the associated media release used the 
official term of ‘Executive Agency’ (Andrews 2006a), the OWS has been repeatedly described 
by both the responsible Minister and the OWS itself as an ‘independent agency’ (Andrews 
2006b). However, executive agency status only meant that the OWS became ‘independent’ from 
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DEWR. As noted by Gourlay (2006:6) ‘the OWS is subordinate to the minister. Indeed, as a 
separate agency whose head is now appointed by the minister, its functions are more susceptible 
to ministerial direction, and so less independent, than when it was within DEWR.’ The Minister 
portrayed the establishment of the ‘independent’ OWS, the allocation of $97 million of additional 
funding over four years, and a strengthening of workplace inspector’s powers to investigate and 
enforce employees’ rights as the government’s response to allegations of worker exploitation 
(Andrews 2006c). Although the OWS 2006-07 annual report is unavailable at the time of writing, 
information on the website suggests that 35 prosecutions were initiated during the year, equal to 
the number of prosecutions undertaken in the previous 10 year period when OWS was part of 
DEWR. 
Despite these measures, following the WorkChoices amendments, allegations of employee 
exploitation increased significantly and the successful ACTU television advertising and protest 
campaign led to opinion polls suggesting that 55% of Australians opposed the amendments (ABC 
2007). The government reacted to this political crisis by passing the Workplace Relations 
Amendment (A Stronger Safety Net) Bill 2007 which introduced a ‘fairness test’ with the 
objective of ensuring fair compensation for employees when protected award conditions were 
modified or removed from agreements. The amendment also provided for the OWS executive 
agency to be replaced by a new statutory authority, the Workplace Ombudsman (WO) on 1 July 
2007. 
Whilst ostensibly an independent agency, in the post-Uhrig Report environment the Minister has 
the power to direct and control the operations of the WO.  This new relationship is emphasised by 
amendments to the Workplace Relations Regulations 2007 (Select Legislative Instrument 2007 
No. 183) which allow the WO to disclose information in order to brief the Minister for various 
purposes, including providing information about a complaint or issue raised by the Minister or 
about proceedings initiated by a workplace inspector. The role assigned to the WO is to ‘provide 
additional protection for employees and will take on a greater role in ensuring that employers 
comply with their legal obligations...[and] … investigate and prosecute employer who break the 
law’ (O’Neill and Neilson 2007). This represented a substantial hardening of the enforcement and 
prosecution policy adopted by the OWS, either as an executive agency or part of DEWR. 
Although no official figures are yet available regarding employer prosecutions, the WO website 
(http://www.wo.gov.au/asp/indes.asp) highlights employer prosecutions through media releases 
and provides an updated figure on penalties achieved through these actions. This reversal of 
reporting standards, when compared to that of the OWS when part of DEWR, serves the 
government’s immediate need to be seen to have addressed the negative effects of WorkChoices. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The regulatory literature distinguishes between independent agencies and those tied to the 
executive arm of government. This exploration of the minimum labour standards’ enforcement 
agency between 1904 and 2007 in Australia has found that the range of institutional locations is 
more complex than envisaged by the literature’s simple dichotomy. Not only does the historical 
review of the ‘inspectorate’ show it located within a government department and as a statutory 
authority, it has also been shown in 2 hybrid forms: attached to a department, and as an executive 
agency. These provide a fuller picture of the continuum of political influence between elected 
representatives having direct control over regulation versus regulation through delegated 
authority. Both Labor and Coalition governments have directly influenced the operation of 
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enforcement agencies, and this has occurred regardless of the institutional location. The direct 
influence is most noticeable in respect of the prosecution activities of the inspectorate.  
The historical investigation also shows that the regulatory literature’s broad proposition that 
governments with a prevailing collectivist ideology will increase both resources and protective 
regulatory activity and governments with an individualistic, conservative ideology will reduce 
resources and decrease regulatory activity doesn’t hold true with regard to the enforcement of 
minimum labour standards in Australia. Regardless of the government’s prevailing ideology 
ministers responsible have continually used their influence to ensure that the enforcement and 
prosecution strategies adopted are aligned with the contemporary political needs of the 
government. This investigation does confirm Bennett’s (1994:146) argument that in the context 
of the Australian conciliation and arbitration system successive federal governments have 
maintained considerably more direct influence over the enforcement agency than other 
institutions within that system. Such behaviour continues the long history of government 
intervention into industrial relations regardless of government rhetoric.  
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